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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the real effects of differences in structures on financial markets, 
especially concerning quasi-equilibrium unemployment. It argues that a vibrant venture 
capital market is an important prerequisite for financing structural change and thus for 
keeping unemployment low in the ongoing transition to the “new economy”. It 
furthermore points out the crucial importance of extensive investor protection in this 
respect. A thriving venture capital market is therefore at odds with the corporatist 
politicoeconomic equilibrium in continental European countries involving extensive 
protection of insiders on labor as well as on financial markets.    
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I. Introduction 
 
The real effects of differences in institutional setups on financial markets are nowadays 
an important research topic. It was already Schumpeter (1911), though, who suggested 
that a well-functioning system of financial intermediation should spur economic growth. 
While somewhat neglected for a long time, the last decade has given rise not only to 
important theoretical progress in this area, but there exists also by now a sizable body of 
empirical evidence that the structure of financial markets can help to explain differences 
in growth of productivity and GDP across countries.
1 The optimal structure of financial 
markets seems to depend crucially on the stage of economic development of the country 
concerned. A predominance of bank financing is possibly superior in earlier stages of 
economic development, whereas a greater reliance on stock markets and on venture 
capital might be preferable in highly developed countries concerning economic growth. 
 
However, a closely related question has been largely neglected up to now, namely 
whether the vastly different labor-market performances across OECD countries, and in 
particular between continental Europe and the US over the last twenty years, might also 
be related to institutional differences on financial markets. It is commonly argued that 
differences in institutions on labor markets are the main driving force in this respect. 
However, while labor market institutions are certainly an important explanatory factor, 
they can hardly account for the whole story. An important caveat concerning the sole 
reliance on institutional differences on labor markets arises from the fact that the US has 
been superior in producing job growth across the whole wage spectrum especially in the 
1990s, i.e., not only low-paid jobs but also high-paid jobs are created on a much larger 
scale than in just about every continental European country. Greater downward real-wage 
flexibility at the lower end of the productivity range of workers along with the often cited 
working poor phenomenon in the US are of little help in explaining the rapidly growing 
demand for qualified workers in the US during the last decade.
2  
 
                                                 
1 Recent contributions are Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan, and Zingales (1998), Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza (1999), Carlin and Mayer (1999), and Wurgler (2000); an overview provides Tsuru (2000). 
2 See, e.g., Mc Kinsey (1994), Acemoglu (1999), and Solow (2000).   2 
This assessment has among other things led to the resurrection of explanations based on 
differences in aggregate demand policies. Yet, considering that the US did not experience 
any sustained increase in inflation along with the tremendous expansion of employment 
over the last twenty years, there would not only have to exist a permanent trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, but such a long-run Phillips curve would 
essentially have to be completely flat. Such a claim  appears to be farfetched, in particular 
in light of the fact that demand-based explanations are also difficult to square with other 
empirical facts. First, it is striking that the capital labor ratio has risen much more in 
continental Europe than in the US since the mid 1970s although higher real interest rates 
in continental Europe than in the US, a crucial factor in demand-based explanations, 
should lead to exactly the opposite result. Second, depressed goods demand should hurt 
both, labor and capital, but profits as well as the capital share have risen substantially in 
Europe during the last two decades (Caballero and Hammour, 1998).         
 
Hence, it seems appropriate to take a closer look at institutional differences between 
continental Europe and the US which do at least not directly pertain to the much-
discussed labor-market rigidities and which might be conducive to non low-wage 
employment growth. Financial market structures are an important and hitherto largely 
neglected such area. A closer look at the effects on job growth of the vastly different 
institutional structures on financial markets in the US and continental Europe seems all 
the more warranted as the establishment of new firms figures centrally in US 
employment growth, and furthermore as the leading success stories in the US of non low- 
wage job growth are the information- and bio-technology sectors, both of which are 
closely connected to the vibrant venture capital market in the US. Companies such as 
Apple, Compaq, Digital Equipment Corporation, Intel, Microsoft, and Sun Microsystems 
were all backed by venture capital. Furthermore, venture-backed firms in the US 
empirically not only create jobs at a much faster rate than Fortune 500 firms, which in the 
first half of 1990s actually decreased staffing levels on average, but they also outperform 
other high-growth companies in terms of employment growth.
3 Essentially the same 
assessment holds for Europe, where venture-backed companies raised employment levels 
                                                 
3 See Jeng and Wells (1998), and Gompers and Lerner (1999a, 137).   3 
on average by 15% per annum in the time period 1991-1995, whereas the average annual 
employment growth among the top 500 European companies in the same time period was 
only 2% (European Venture Capital Association, 1996).  
 
Countries are supposed to specialize according to their institutional comparative 
advantage
4, and a well-functioning venture capital market might have given the US an 
institutional comparative advantage in implementing more quickly structural change and 
in moving precisely into those sectors which have turned out to be facilitating 
employment growth in recent years. Differences in financial market structures between 
continental Europe and the US and in fact essentially all Anglo-Saxon countries are still 
vast, although they appear to be diminishing somewhat in recent years. Anglo-Saxon 
capital markets tend to be stock market based, with relatively clear-cut accounting rules, 
with disperse ownership of the many large public firms, with institutional investors such 
as large pension funds playing an important role, with managers’ policies being tightly 
aligned with shareholders’ interests through their income depending greatly on stock 
market performance and by the threat of hostile takeovers, and last but not least with 
there being a vibrant venture capital market which allows a high degree of 
entrepreneurial activity in particular concerning the founding of new firms.  
 
In contrast, continental European capital markets tend to be still, though to a decreasing 
degree, dominated by large banks, which entertain close relationships with large firms not 
least via extensive cross shareholdings. Corporate governance largely rests with these 
banks via proxy voting, blockholding of shares and ownership concentration is 
widespread, but management has nonetheless a lot more room for discretionary 
maneuver, inter alia due to opaque accounting rules, and management is not expected to 
maximize merely shareholder value. Stakeholder interests matter, as is exemplified by the 
German codetermination law, and finally the size and importance of the venture capital 
market is still small by Anglo-Saxon standards.
5  
 
                                                 
4 See Hall and Soskice (1999); Schertler (1999) shows theoretically how cross-country differences in 
venture capital markets affect the pattern of specialization. 
5 See Edwards and Fischer (1994), Roe (1999), and Coffee (1999).   4 
This paper tries to deal with the question whether these idiosyncracies in institutional 
structures on financial markets, in particular concerning the venture capital market, 
contribute to explaining the superior employment performance over the last about two 
decades not only of the US but also of most other Anglo-Saxon countries compared to 
continental Europe (Garibaldi and Mauro, 1999). In doing so, the paper proceeds in three 
steps. Section II establishes links between financial market structures and unemployment. 
Section III discusses the institutional determinants of a thriving venture capital market. 
Section IV discusses why the notion of corporatism which is widely embraced in 
continental Europe is at odds with a  vibrant venture capital market. Section V presents 
some concludings remarks.  
 
 
II. Does Financial Market Structure Affect Unemployment? 
 
1. Relating Investor Protection and External Funding on the Microlevel 
 
The key question in corporate finance is rather simple: Why do external investors ever 
get their money back and are not completely ripped off on a routine basis by corporate 
insiders, i.e., managers or entrepreneurs and possibly also workers? While there are 
undoubtedly many answers to this question, a string of recent papers by La Porta et al.
6 
has shown that the solution to this puzzle is centrally related to the level of effective legal 
protection which external investors are granted in different countries. To formally 
analyze this issue, La Porta et al. (1999b) have recently developed a simple, intuitively 
appealing micromodel, which serves as a convenient starting point for the broader 
question how financial market structure affects real activity and unemployment. They 
consider a setup where an entrepreneur owns cash flow rights α of the firm. He wants to 
undertake an investment I, which yields a return once invested of RI. The entrepreneur 
wants to raise external funds to finance the investment. However, external investors are 
reluctant to provide money since they know that the entrepreneur has ex post the 
opportunity to divert the fraction s of the profits directly to himself, so that only the 
                                                 
6 See La  Porta et al. (1997), (1998), (1999a), and (1999b).   5 
remainder  RI s) 1 ( −  is split according to legal cash flow rights. The better is the legal 
protection of external investors as measured by k, the costlier it is for the entrepreneur to 
engage in such illicit diversion, though. It is particularly convenient to assume a standard 
quadratic cost of theft function 
2 5 . 0 ) , ( s k s k c = . Entrepreneurs are simply assumed to 
maximize their return on the investment which consists of legal cash flow rights plus 
diverted profits minus  the costs of stealing:  
  RI ks sRI RI s U E
2 5 . 0 ) 1 ( − + − = α .  (1)     
Assuming a normalized rate of return of zero, the amount of external funds  ) (α F , which 
the entrepreneur can raise, depends on what external investors expect to get back on their 
investment after appropriation has taken place: 
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where  k s / ) 1 ( * α − =  denotes the optimal amount of stealing from the point of view of 
the entrepreneur for the assumed quadratic cost of theft function. Figure 1 presents the 
hump-shaped form of the function  ) (α F . A higher stake of the entrepreneur in the firm 
as denoted by α exerts two opposing effects on the amount of external funds  ) (α F  that 
the entrepreneur can raise. The direct effect is to reduce the amount of profits that is left 
for the external investor, making him more reluctant to provide funds. However, the 
indirect positive effect comes via a reduction in the optimal amount of stealing for the 
entrepreneur, which makes it more attractive for the external investor to give money to 
the firm. The maximum amount of funds that the entrepreneur can raise in this simple 
setup is equal to  4 / ) (kRI , which is clearly increasing in the level of legal protection of 
investors k. Hence, the better external investor are protected by law and its enforcement 
against ex-post appropriation by entrepreneurs, the greater is ceteris paribus the amount 
of funds that they are willing to provide and the greater is also the feasible set of projects 
that can be financed externally.  
   6 
Figure 1: Availability of Funds to Entrepreneur 
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Source: La Porta et al. (1999b, 15). 
 
 
2. A Macromodel Linking Financial Market Imperfections and Unemployment 
 
In order to discuss the relationship between financial market structure and 
unemployment, this microlevel approach must be transformed into a macroeconomic 
analysis which also incorporates labor-market imperfections. Standard models of the 
labor market for determining employment growth and  in particular the quasi-equilibrium 
unemployment rate, do usually not, at least not explicitly, take into account financial 
market  imperfections. This is the case in the workhorse NAIRU model or in flow models 
of the labor market where the Beveridge curve plays a central role, which relates 
unemployment to vacancies.  
 
However, once one abandones the notion of perfect financial markets, both standard 
models already open up an important indirect channel via which the structure of financial 
markets might affect the quasi-equilibrium unemployment rate (Geroski, Gregg, and Van 
Reenen, 1997). Empiricial evidence suggests that in particular young and small firms are 
liquidity constrained in their investment decisisions, so that financial market structures 
which are conducive to channelling funds to young and small firms can be expected to   7 
boost the founding and growth rates of new firms (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). This 
enhances competition on goods markets thus reducing mark-ups by firms on costs and 
shifting the labor demand schedule  of firms outwards. For given wage-setting behavior, 
a reduction in the quasi-equilibrium unemployment rate results. Furthermore, wage-
setting itself might be moderated by such a financial market structure because wage 
restraint is rewarded with a greater increase in employment due to more new firms being 
founded in response. Finally, a larger relative stream of new firms entering markets each 
period facilitates structural change thus shifting the Beveridge curve inwards and 
reducing quasi-equilibrium unempoyment also in the flow model of the labor market. 
 
Barriers to the entry of new firms are of course not only due to financial market 
imperfections. A recent study by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) shows that 
barriers to entrepreneurship based on the criteria administrative burdens on startups, 
regulatory and administrative opacity, and barriers to competition are substantially larger 
in continental European countries compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. This is the case 
even though this study abstracts from differences in financial market structures. Yet, 
already the following two stylized facts indicate that differences in financial market 
structures might matter in this context. First, continental European countries rely to a 
much larger degree on debt financing of firms than Anglo-Saxon countries where equity  
and venture capital financing is more common. Second, especially venture capital 
financing is more suitable for new firms due to their general lack of collateral. Taking 
these differences in financial market structures into account can only lead to further 
tilting the balance concerning entry of new firms in favor of Anglo-Saxon countries.   
    
Hence, the decision whether or not to establish a new production unit must be at the 
center of any comprehensive model of the determination of quasi-equilibrium 
unemployment which integrates both, labor and financial market imperfections. This is 
precisely the gist of a macromodel which Caballero and Hammour (1999) have recently 
proposed, namely that financial market imperfections exacerbate quasi-equilibrium 
unemployment which is caused by labor market rigidities. The model is based on the idea 
that employment is only possible if entrepreneurs, workers, and financiers are all willing   8 
to enter into joint production units and that contractual relationships between 
entrepreneurs and workers as well as between entrepreneurs and financiers are all but 
perfect. In particular, both relationships usually require some relationship-specific 
investment and are therefore open to the well-known hold-up problem, i.e., workers as 
well as management may wield the power to at least partially appropriate capital ex post, 
assuming that capital undergoes the greatest transformation and becomes most 
relationship-specific once invested.  
 
In other words, if capital is not only largely sunk after being invested, but if fully state-
contingent contracts are also either not enforcible or too complex, and if the legal 
environment does not put great emphasis on protecting capital from ex-post appropriation 
by workers and management, rational financiers will already ex ante erect a high 
threshold value for the profitability of projects they are asked to finance. This is the case 
because financiers know that entrepreneurs and workers will ex post try to renegotiate 
payments to production factors to their detriment. For that part of the capital which is 
sunk and not collateralized, financiers will ex post only receive a fraction of the accruing 
rents which the project produces. The size of the payments hinges on the ex post relative 
bargaining power of production factors and, of course, on the size of the rents, but not on 
the ex-ante opportunity costs of capital.  
 
Total employment depends on the aggregate number of production units that are 
operational, which in turn hinges on the rates at which new production units are created 
and at which old ones are destroyed, as well as on the capital labor ratio in each 
production unit. Let us for the moment assume a fixed capital-labor ratio which is 
evidently more appropriate in the short run than in the long run. Both types of 
investment, creation of new units and continuation of old units, face a profitability and a 
financial constraint. The profitability constraint simply states that the expected 
discounted value of all future profits must be positive. The more rigid  labor markets are 
and the higher therefore wage costs are, the less likely it is that the profitability constraint 
for creating a new production unit or for continuing an old unit is satisfied. If the 
profitability constraint is not satisfied for an envisaged new unit, less creation investment   9 
takes place and less new firms enter the market. If it is no longer satisfied for an old unit, 
privately efficient or “Schumpeterian” destruction of this very unit takes place. Whether 
this destruction is also socially efficient depends crucially on the ability of the economy 
to create new units and to thus reallocate the released production factors into new firms. 
Badly functioning labor and financial markets are important factors that can make 
privately efficient destruction of firms socially inefficient because they reduce the 
mobility of labor and they raise the contractual difficulties in founding new firms. This 
raises the probability that the workers who are released from the destroyed unit are not 
reallocated to working in a new firm but rather remain trapped in unemployment.
7 
 
The financial constraint for creating new production units states that the total amount of 
external financing must not exceed the ex-post, i.e., after the capital is sunk, feasible 
claim of the external financier on the net present value of total profits. The higher the  
productivity of a new unit is, the more likely it is that the financing and not the 
profitability contraint is binding in creating new production units. Refinancing an old 
production unit in times of crisis, when the entrepreneur himself lacks the liquidity to 
inject additional funds into the distressed unit, displays the important feature of a wedge 
between the option values to the entrepreneur and to the financier of refinancing the 
distressed firm. This is the case because once the additional funds are committed to the 
distressed unit and in case the firm recovers, the sunk cost problem once again enables 
the entrepreneur to renegotiate payments to the external financier down according to the 
ex-post terms of trade between the entrepreneur and the financier. This inability of the 
financier to capture the full set of rents that is associated with refinancing a distressed 
unit is the basic rationale for why liquidations take place although they are not only 
socially but also privately inefficient. Hence, the greater contractual difficulties are, i.e., 
the less protective the legal environment is of financiers, and the more indebted firms 
already are, the more likely it is that such inefficient liquidations occur. Overall it is clear 
that the more severe financial constraints are, the less creation and the more destruction 
of in fact profitable units takes place. 
                                                 
7 Active labor market policies are supposed to prevent such a lock-in effect in unemployment. However, 
their empirical success in doing so is at best mixed; see, e.g., Calmfors and Skedinger (1995).   10 
 
Concerning the level of quasi-equilibrium unemployment, the model has the following 
implications. For quasi-equilibrium unemployment to occur, it is a necessary condition 
that the labor market is imperfect and that workers dispose over the market power to 
appropriate part of the rents which are created in production units. Obvious factors 
contributing to such labor-market rigidities are e.g. high firing costs, strong unions, and 
generous unemployment benefits. This rent component in wages, which is due to 
contracting impediments in the labor market, upsets the free-entry condition for new 
firms. It reduces the expected profitability of committing capital to new production units 
below the return required by capital markets. This disequilibrium situation is resolved by 
an increase in quasi-equilibrium unemployment, which is induced by a lower creation 
rate of new firms. The rise in quasi-equilibrium unemployment and the decrease in hiring 
lead to higher unemployment duration, thus lowering the opportunity costs of labor. This 
offsets rent appropriation by workers, and restores the rate of return required by the 
capital market for capital to enter into new joint production units or refinancing distressed 
firms. It is important to note that at this rate of quasi-equilibrium unemployment actual 
wages inclusive of the rent component can fall below the wage in the efficient market 
clearing reference situation. This possibility arises due to three factors: Creation 
incentives as well as the opportunity costs of labor are lower, and inefficient units can 
survive longer thus inducing a kind of sclerosis and reducing productivity growth. The 
last effect occurs because inefficient destruction lowers the opportunity costs of labor 
thus reducing the pressure on inefficient firms to close down.  
 
Extending the time horizon of the analysis into the longer run, a high potential of workers 
to ex post appropriate capital leads to even worse effects on the quasi-equilibrium rate of 
unemployment.
8 The capital-labor ratio is of course not fixed in the longer run. Rather, 
capital as the appropriated factor can over time adjust the production technology in such a 
way that the appropriation potential of labor is mitigated. Capital can achieve this by 
raising drastically the capital-labor ratio of production thus reducing its dependency on 
the appropriating factor labor and its ex-post appropriation potential. Hence, in countries 
                                                 
8 See Caballero and Hammour (1998), and Berthold, Fehn, and Thode (1999).   11 
with high insider power on labor markets such as in continental Europe there is a further 
rationale for firms, besides rising real wages and rising costs of labor relative to capital, 
to massively raise the capital-labor ratio of production. This unemployment created by a 
rising capital-labor ratio accumulates with the one that is already created by insufficient 
creation and excessive destruction due to productivity and financing constraints.
9 
 
If only the capital market is imperfect, though, there is no quasi-equilibrium 
unemployment. This is the case because the lower degree of creation and the higher rate 
of inefficient or spurious destruction of firms due to financial market imperfections, are 
fully and immediately absorbed by a falling compensation of labor under perfect labor 
markets. However, in case of imperfect labor markets and rent sharing of workers, 
financial constraints further aggravate quasi-equilibrium unemployment. The reduction in 
the steady-state demand for labor, that an imperfect capital market gives rise to via less 
creation and more spurious destruction, is not fully and immediately absorbed by lower 
real wages if workers possess the ex-post bargaining power to appropriate part of the 
arising quasi rents. Hence, concerning the level of quasi-equilibrium unemployment, 
capital-market contraints compound with labor-market rigidities. 
   
The degree to which the legal environment protects financiers from ex-post appropriation 
by workers and management therefore not only has an important influence on the ability 
of an economy to create new units, but also to avoid excessive and wasteful destruction 
of in fact profitable firms. This latter effect is in particular problematic as it not only 
directly increases the quasi-equilibrium rate of unemployment but also because it lowers 
productivity growth due to sclerosis effects. In sum, the presented macromodel has 
straightforward implications for the effects of financial market imperfections on quasi-
equilibrium unemployment. The less the institional and legal setup on financial markets 
protects financiers against ex-post appropriation by entrepreneurs, the higher will be the 
quasi-equilibrium rate of unemployment for any given level of labor-market 
                                                 
9 This fits with recent empirical evidence showing that the level of employment protection,  which raises 
the appropriation potential of insiders on the labor market vis-à-vis firms, is an important factor in 
explaining cross-country differences in employment growth over the last two decades; see Garibaldi and 
Mauro (1999).   12 
imperfections. The basic rationale for this result is the greater reluctance of investors to 
provide funds to finance creation or continuation investments.  
 
 
3. The Degree of Investor Protection Across Countries 
 
Investigating the effective level of legal protection of external investors and its effects on 
real economic activity has been a thriving research topic in the corporate governance 
literature in recent years.
10 The results show that the level of effective legal protection 
varies substantially across highly developed OECD countries, and that the legal heritage 
of countries seems to matter considerably. It turns out to be convenient to put countries 
into four groups: Anglo-Saxon countries with a common law tradition in contrast to, 
German, French, and Scandinavian law countries, which all have civil law traditions. 
This grouping is supposed to mean that the countries belonging to one of the four legal 
groups have common roots concerning legislation and its enforcement on financial 
markets. These commonalities might be due to colonial ties or simply due to copying of 
regulations as did essentially a number of East-Asian countries with German law. It is 
furthermore important to distinguish between shareholder rights and creditor rights 
because very different types of legal protection apply in the two categories, and because 
the level of effective legal protection accorded to the two kinds of investors varies 
considerably within many countries.  
 
The following tables 1a and b show the results of the in-depth analysis of these issues by 
La Porta et al. It turns out that the Anglo-Saxon countries protect in particular 
shareholders substantially better than all other countries. This conforms with the well-
known facts that not only the capitalization of the stock market and of the venture capital 
market relative to GDP, but also that the number of firms relative to the population and 
the number of initial public offerings relative to the population are by far the largest 
among Anglo-Saxon countries. A much stronger protection of minority shareholders and 
of shareholder interests in general in the common law Anglo-Saxon countries also 
                                                 
10 See La  Porta et al. (1997), (1998), (1999a), (1999b), Carlin and Mayer (1999), and Wurgler (2000).   13 
squares well with the more dispersed ownership structure of public firms compared to all 
countries with a civil law tradition and with a higher valuation of firms relative to their 
fundamentals as measured by Tobin’s Q. Countries influenced by the French civil law 
tradition provide in general the least effective legal protection to investors, be they 
shareholders or creditors. German and Scandinavian law countries are somewhat in 
between. Comparing therefore Anglo-Saxon with French and Scandinavian law 
countries, it can be expected that the institutional setup on financial markets works in 
favor of a superior employment performance of Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
A more intriguing case are the German law countries in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. While they give far less effective legal protection to shareholders, they accord 
the same overall average legal protection to creditors, and they actually give compared to 
all large OECD common law countries a better effective legal protection to creditors 
except for the UK. This fits again nicely with the well-known facts that banks play a 
large role in countries with a German law tradition on capital markets and that firms in 
these countries are to a relatively large degree debt financed. It should also after all not be 
forgotten that the German group consists of countries which had a substantially better 
unemployment record than the Anglo-Saxon countries until the early 1980s. It is 
therefore puzzling in which way the structure on financial markets can contribute to 
explaining why the unemployment performance of German law countries relative to 
Anglo-Saxon countries has so drastically deteriorated over the last roughly twenty years. 
   14 
Table 1a: Legal Origins and External Capital Markets – Summary Presentation 
 
 Domestic 
Firms/Pop 
IPOs/Pop Debt/GNP  Non-Debt 
External 
Capital/GNP 
Share-
holder 
Rights1 
Creditor 
Rights2 
Tobin’s 
Q 
English-Law Mean  61.66  3.01  0.75  0.62  4.3  2.4  1.2552 
OECD Mean3  43.20 2.29  0.78  0.50  4.5  1.8  1.2812 
Non-OECD Mean4  98.59 4.21  0.63  0.87  4.0  3.7  1.2032 
              
French-Law Mean5  12.71 0.29  0.63  0.19  2.0  1.2  1.1518 
German-Law Mean6  17.30 0.15  0.97  0.37  2.2  2.4  1.1536 
Scandinavian-Law 
Mean7 
27.27 2.14  0.57  0.30  3.0  2.0  1.1202 
 
1. Shareholder rights:  An index aggregating shareholder rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: 
 1.  the  country  allows  shareholders  to  mail  their  proxy  vote; 
2. shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders’ Meeting; 
3. cumulative voting is allowed; 
4. an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; or 
5. when the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 per  
cent. The index ranges from 0 to 5.   
 
2. Creditor rights:  An index aggregating creditor rights. The index  is formed by adding 1 when: 
1. the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum 
dividends, to file for reorganization; 
2. secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); 
3. the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization; 
4. secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds that result 
from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm. The index ranges from 0 to 4.   
3. English-Law OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, and US. 
4. English-Law Non-OECD countries: Hong Kong, Israel, and Singapore. 
5. French-Law countries: Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal,  and Spain. 
6. German-Law countries: Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland. 
7. Scandinavian-Law countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
 
Sources: La Porta et al. (1997), (1998), (1999b), and own calculations. 
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Table 1b: Legal Origins of Countries and External Capital Markets  
 
Country Domestic 
Firms/Pop 
IPOs/Pop Debt/GNP  Non-Debt 
External 
Capital/GNP 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Creditor 
Rights 
Tobin’s 
Q 
English-Law 
OECD 
           
Australia 63.55  -  0.76  0.49  4  1  1.2345 
Canada 40.86  4.93  0.72  0.39  5  1  1.1510 
Ireland 20.00  0.75  0.38  0.27  4  1  1.2862 
New Zealand  69.00  0.66  0.90  0.28  4  3  1.1949 
UK 35.68  2.01  1.13  1.00  5  4  1.4257 
US 30.11  3.11  0.81  0.58  5 1  1.3950 
Mean 43.20  2.29  0.78 0.50  4.5 1.8  1.2812 
             
English-Law 
Non-OECD 
           
Hong Kong  88.16  5.16  -  1.18  5  4  1.0424 
Israel 127.60  1.80  0.66 0.25  3  4  1.1672 
Singapore 80.00  5.67 0.60  1.18  4  3  1.4001 
Mean 98.59  4.21  0.63 0.87  4.0 3.7  1.2032 
             
French-Law              
Belgium   15.50  0.30  0.38  0.17  0  2  1.1021 
France   8.05  0.17  0.96  0.23  3  0  1.0904 
Greece   21.60  0.30  0.23  0.07  2  1  1.4218 
Italy   3.91  0.31  0.55  0.08  1  2  1.0156 
Mexico   2.28  0.03  0.47  0.22  1  0  1.3365 
Netherlands   21.13  0.66  1.08  0.52  2  2  1.2213 
Portugal   19.50  0.50 0.64  0.08  3  1  0.9577 
Spain   9.71  0.07  0.75  0.17  4  2  1.0691 
Mean 11.81  0.28  0.58 0.18  2.2 1.2  1.1445 
             
German-Law              
Austria   13.87  0.25  0.79  0.06  2  3  1.1088 
Germany   5.14  0.08  1.12  0.13  1  3  1.2359 
Japan   17.78  0.26  1.22  0.62  4  2  1.3020 
South Korea   15.88  0.02  0.74  0.44  2  3  1.0663 
Switzerland   33.85  -  -  0.62  2  1  1.0550 
Mean 17.30  0.15  0.97 0.37  2.2 2.4  1.1536 
             
Scandin.-Law              
Denmark 50.40  1.80 0.34  0.21  2  3  1.1671 
Finland 13.00  0.60  0.75  0.25  3  1  1.0812 
Norway   33.00  4.50  0.64  0.22  4  2  1.1450 
Sweden 12.66  1.66  0.55  0.51  3  2  1.0875 
Mean 27.27  2.14  0.57 0.30  3.0 2.0  1.1202 
 
Sources: La Porta et al. (1997), (1998), (1999b), and own calculations.   16 
4. Financial Market Imperfections and Relative Changes in Unemployment 
     
A crucial step in resolving this puzzle consists in recognizing that the economic 
environment has fundamentally changed over the last twenty years. Not only have the 
German law countries essentially finished the catch-up process after the war by the end of 
the 1970s, but all highly developed countries have entered into another phase of radical 
structural change, which can in a stylized form be described as moving away from the 
industrial sector toward the service sector and toward the information-technology sector. 
This is nowadays often called the transition to the “new economy”. In particular the 
manufacturing of largely standardized industrial goods, where fixed capital investment 
and economies of scale play a large role, is rapidly becoming an outdated mode of 
production in highly developed countries. It furthermore appears that the economic 
environment in general has become more volatile meaning that the frequency and size of 
shocks hitting firms each period has risen. The key question in this context is of course 
which financial market structure is more suitable for financing such a process of radical 
structural change and for coping with such rising volatilities.     
 
Their relatively sophisticated protection of creditors gives German law countries a 
comparative institutional advantage in debt financing which is reflected in close and 
long-lasting bank-firm relationships. Such an institutional setup appears to be 
advantageous mainly in stable times where countries are moving along a more or less 
already known technological trajectory and where the aggregate level of investment into 
fixed capital is crucial for the overall performance of the economy. Past profits are then a 
relatively good indicator for future success so that the information problem which firms 
should receive financing is less difficult to disentangle. Furthermore, fixed capital can 
very well serve as collateral, making debt-financing also advantageous from this 
perspective. Investment into fixed capital can in principle lower unemployment by raising 
the marginal productivity of labor if growth of real wage costs lags behind. It is therefore 
not very surprising that German law countries such as Germany itself or Japan, which 
appear to have an edge in protecting creditors and where there are strong ties between 
banks and large firms, display comparatively high rates of fixed capital investment. Their   17 
relatively high rates of employment growth in the first half of the post-war period also fit 
into this picture (Carlin and Mayer, 1999).  
 
However, while such a financial market structure might have been appropriate in the first 
half of the post-war period, it is hardly suitable for the current period of rapid structural 
change, where especially the correlation between past profits and future investment 
opportunities is much lower. A key problem in financing structural change nowadays 
appears to be how to get free cash flows out of large established firms with few profitable 
investment projects into the hands of new, liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs with 
promising ideas for investment projects in the fledgling sectors, where employment 
growth mainly takes place. A relatively strong bargaining position of shareholders vis-à-
vis management as is the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries helps in this respect because 
it forces management in the established large public firms to pay out a larger fraction of 
such free cash flows, which can then be channelled back into investment projects 
according to capital market profitability criteria.
11 
 
Fixed capital investment of in particular large, established firms is not a promising route 
for achieving employment growth in highly developed OECD countries nowadays. First, 
a large part of this kind of investment takes place in the industrial sector where at best 
only very limited employment growth or, more likely, a further decline in employment 
can be expected due to the aforementioned patterns of structural change. This process of 
structural change is enhanced by the forces of globalization which give the newly 
emerging economies an advantage in imitative investments and in manufacturing largely 
standardized industrial products. Second, this type of investment takes place in already 
existing firms, where entrenchend insiders particularly in the highly regulated continental 
European labor markets are in a good position to convert a rising marginal productivity of 
labor into wage increases for themselves rather than into employment gains (Lindbeck, 
1996). Fixed capital investment was an important component of employment growth in 
the catch-up phase after the war when radical innovations by the leading industrial 
nations could basically be mimicked and when insiders on the labor market were not as 
                                                 
11 See Hubbard (1998), Hellwig (2000), and Wurgler (2000).   18 
well entrenchend yet. But the more a country moves to the frontier of economic 
development, the less simple investment into fixed capital suffices for achieving 
employment growth. This fits well with the observation that countries such as Germany 
and Japan seem to have profited from their institutional setup on the capital market 
during the first half of the post-war period, but that this has become more doubtful during 
the last decade.      
 
Key aspects for achieving employment growth in highly developed countries and thus in 
later stages of economic development appear to be the ability to finance structural change 
by funding R&D, by orchestrating radical product innovations, and by establishing new 
firms. This is in particular true if employment growth is not to take place only in the form 
of low-paid service sector jobs. The type of investment rather than its pure level makes a 
difference for the effects on employment. It is in fact sometimes argued that continental 
European countries such as Germany suffer from  an “innovation crisis” as well as from a 
severe lack of newly created firms, and that these two phenomena lie at the heart of the 
unemployment problem.
12  
 
Incremental or process innovations in industries where the main technological 
breakthroughs essentially occurred either at the end of last century or during the first half 
of this century are hardly avenues for achieving major employment gains anymore. 
Expanding employment in the production of largely standardized industrial products is 
close to infeasible which is at least partially due to globalization and rapidly advancing 
labor-saving technological progress in this area. Rather, employment growth largely takes 
place in the service sector or in the production of new and niche products which are often 
technologically advanced. A particularly important source of employment growth in the 
1990s have also been investments into information technology. However, similar to the 
service sector, investments into information technology largely produce intangible assets 
which are rarely accepted as collateral so that countries which have trouble in adequately 
financing such high-risk ventures by means of equity or venture capital have an inherent 
disadvantage in obtaining employment growth in the thriving service and information-
                                                 
12 See Audretsch (1995), Becker and Hellmann (1999), and Carlin and Mayer (1999).   19 
technology sectors compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries.
13 Empirical evidence indeed 
indicates that the use of debt financing depends positively on asset tangibility.
14 
Furthermore, a large stream of new firms entering the product market each period 
facilitates structural change and in particular the transition to those sectors, so that 
countries which provide an institutional environment which is conducive to the creation 
of new firms should have less problems in managing the transition to a more service- and 
information-technology-based economy without a massive rise in unemployment. 
 
Having pointed out that R&D, product innovations, and new firms are likely to be major 
determinants of an economy’s success in terms of achieving employment growth 
nowadays, it is important to realize that these are all high-risk activities where problems 
of asymmetric information loom large and where the project itself usually does not 
constitute viable collateral.
15 Furthermore, the failure rate among such projects will 
generally be high while the few successful ones are likely to produce large profits for a 
considerable time span. R&D, product innovations, and new firms are therefore 
dependent on a particular financial market structure. First, the institutional structure on 
the financial market must be well-prepared to handle problems of asymmetric 
information. Second, it must be able to provide funding to highly risky projects without 
receiving much in the way of collateral. Third, as it is highly uncertain which projects 
will be successful, it must be able to sort out and provide financing to a very large 
number of projects, and there must also be the possibility to abandon projects quickly 
once their failure becomes apparent. Fourth, the capital market must provide a suitable 
environment for financiers to convert successful projects into cash for themselves, e.g. by 
going public. It must help to prevent workers and management from breaching the ex-
ante agreed upon terms of trade by reducing ex post payments to financiers even though a 
project has in fact been successful.  
 
                                                 
13 See Schertler (1999); Hellwig (2000) points out that German banks collect an average of about 80% of 
their claims on collateralized loans in bankruptcy so that bankruptcy is not an unmitigated disaster for 
them, thus also reducing their incentive to engage in close monitoring which supposedly is a virtue of bank-
dominated  financial markets. 
14 See Gompers and Lerner (1999a, 143); Hall (1999) presents empirical evidence based on stock market 
valuations in the US that the aggregate importance of intangible assets has risen considerably.  
15 See Guiso (1997), Brown (1997), Harhoff (1997), and Weigand and Audretsch (1999).   20 
These conditions are arguably more likely to be fulfilled on an Anglo-Saxon type stock-
market based financial market with in particular a thriving venture-capital market and 
with an elaborate effective legal protection of shareholders and venture capitalists than on 
German law financial markets.
16 In particular, venture capitalists participate fully in the 
profits of successful projects so that they are more willing than creditors to finance highly 
risky projects. In addition, venture capitalists are especially able to reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information due to their active engagement in the process of actually carrying 
out the project and due their expertise in monitoring firms in the sector concerned. 
Furthermore, the number of projects that are initially financed is larger when there is a 
well-developed venture capital market. Recent empirical studies show that there is indeed 
a positive relationship between innovation activity and founding new firms on the one 
hand and a well-developed market for venture capital on the other hand.
17 Hence, a high 
effective legal protection of shareholders and a thriving venture capital market might 
have become more important than in the first half of the post-war period for achieving a 
high level of employment growth.  
 
Bank-based capital markets with a good effective protection of creditors but not of 
shareholders and an underdeveloped venture capital market, which display a bias toward 
debt financing, are in addition negatively affected by the general increase in the volatility 
of the economic environment which appears to have come about with globalization.
18 A 
more volatile economic environment with greater and more frequent shocks increases the 
general probability of firms going bankrupt, thus making potential creditors more 
reluctant to provide debt-financing because a more risky economic environment affects 
them asymmetrically. While payments to creditors are limited to interest plus principal in 
good states of the world, they may lose all their money in bad states. Financing of 
projects and as a consequence also labor demand is therefore reduced by a more volatile 
economic environment in countries where debt financing is predominant.
19  
                                                 
16 See Black and Gilson (1998), Hellmann and Puri (1999), La Porta et al. (1999a), Tsuru (2000), and 
Wurgler (2000). 
17 See OECD (1996), Kortum and Lerner (1998), and Hellmann and Puri (1999). 
18 See Aizenman and Powell (1997), Calvo and Mendoza (1997), Rodrik (1997), and Fehn (2000). 
19 Recent empirical evidence for Germany confirms that there exists indeed  a negative relationship 
between employment and the debt-asset ratio of firms; see Funke, Maurer, and Strulik (1999).   21 
 
In sum, the described important changes in the economic environment have caused 
countries with an institutional comparative advantage in debt financing via banks, which 
is among other things due to a better relative legal protection of creditors than of 
shareholders, to fall behind in comparison to countries with an institutional comparative 
advantage in equity and venture capital financing. Coping with radical structural change 
and rising volatilities without producing mass unemployment is therefore difficult in 
continental Europe. This is the case not only due to far more regulated and rigid labor 
markets, but also because the financial market structure is either generally inferior 
compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, as is the case in the French and Scandinavian 
countries, or because the financial market structure is based on close bank-firm 
relationships and debt-financing like in the German law countries, which is better suited 
for a more predictable economic environment where fixed capital investment, expansion 
of already existing firms, economies of scale, and incremental innovations prevail. It 
should in any case be no longer surprising that especially those OECD-countries with a 
thriving venture capital market and good shareholder protection have had an edge in 
terms of achieving employment growth during the last roughly two decades (figures 2a 
and b), since a well-developed venture capital market and sophisticated shareholder 
protection are crucial prerequisites for R&D, radical product innovations, and the 
founding of new firms, which are in turn indispensable for creating employment growth 
in times of radical structural change.      
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Figure 2a: Employment Growth and Venture Capital 
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Figure 2b: Employment Growth and Shareholder Protection 
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Note: Employment growth is average value in % for 1986 through 2001; values for 1999, 2000, and 2001 
are OECD estimates and projections. Venture capital is mean in per mil of GDP between 1986 and 1995. 
  
Data sources: Jeng and Wells (1998), La Porta et al. (1998), and OECD.   
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III. What Are the Determinants of Venture Capital Funding? 
 
1. Some Important Facts Concerning Venture Capital Markets 
 
If a well-functioning venture capital market is indeed important for keeping 
unemployment low in the current phase of rapid structural change, the question 
immediately arises why are there such persistent differences in venture capital markets 
across countries. There can be little doubt that these persistent differences do indeed 
exist, with the Anglo-Saxon countries and among them especially the US and the UK 
having the by far most developed venture capital markets. Apart from pure size relative 
to GDP, venture capital markets in the US and the UK are also better able to finance 
early-stage and high-tech investments which are crucial for achieving significant positive 
effects of venture capital on real activity and employment growth. Table 2 gives an 
overview over venture capital markets across major OECD countries which supports this 
assessment. Concerning in particular Germany, though, the caveat is in order that the 
German venture capital market has experienced considerable growth rates in the second 
half of the 1990s in the wake of the establishment of the “Neuer Markt”, which can be 
seen as an attempt to emulate the success of NASDAQ in providing  young firms with a 
less cumbersome avenue for going public (Coffee, 1999).    
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Table 2: Country Comparison of Venture Capital Markets 
 
 Venture  Capital 
Investments as per mil 
of average GDP 
Early Stage 
Investments as per mil 
of average GDP 
Private Equity New 
Funds Raised as per mil 
of average GDP 
Countries 1986  1995  Mean  1986  1995  Mean  1986 1995 Mean 
Australia NA  1.336  0.814  NA  0.526  0.207 NA 1.672  0.790 
Austria 0.014  0.007  0.020  0.014  0.002  0.012  0.011  0.009  0.019 
Belgium 1.207  0.628  0.608  0.417  0.038  0.148 2.133 
 
0.946 0.864 
Canada 0.206  0.855  0.353  0.082  0.376  0.144  0.483  2.349  0.896 
Denmark 0.201  0.132  0.156  0.041  0.031  0.043 0.288 0.253 0.302 
Finland NA  0.358  0.202  NA  0.096  0.071  NA 
 
0.641 0.312 
France 0.194  0.336  0.451  0.032  0.027  0.053  0.168  0.799  0.937 
Germany 0.031  0.375  0.240  0.007  0.063  0.032 0.036 0.148 0.290 
Ireland 0.425  0.557  0.620  0.194  0.026  0.121  0.864 
 
0.360 1.315 
Italy 0.021  0.295  0.210  0.011  0.071  0.033  0.204  0.419  0.316 
Japan NA  0.216  0.102  NA  0.047  0.018  NA  0.400  0.240 
Netherlands 0.532 1.433  0.743  0.127 0.304  0.119  1.080 
 
1.025 0.717 
N. Zealand  NA  0.517  0.191  NA  0.062  0.027  NA  0.231  0.422 
Norway NA  1.337  0.476  NA  0.061  0.055  NA  0.520  0.369 
Portugal 0.004  0.990  0.569  0.004  0.087  0.086 0.036 
 
NA 0.924 
Spain 0.087  0.425  0.249  0.037  0.056  0.070  0.000  0.450  0.337 
Sweden 0.313  0.158  0.202  0.034  0.043  0.027  0.592  3.101  1.056 
Switzerland 0.068 0.105  0.157  0.050 0.004  0.034  0.033 
 
0.240 0.263 
UK 0.793  1.033  0.969  0.194  0.042  0.136  0.955  2.761  2.581 
US 0.556  0.638  0.456  0.058  0.191  0.075  1.539  4.960  2.405 
Early stage investments include only seed and start-up investments; private equity new funds is defined as 
committed, but not yet paid capital to private equity funds, i.e., includes money raised for all stages of 
investment.  
 
Source: Jeng and Wells (1998). 
 
As the corporate finance literature has recognized the importance of venture capital 
markets for real activity and the persistence of these puzzling cross-country differences, it 
has in recent years devoted considerable efforts into theoretically and empirically 
investigating the determinants of venture capital funding across countries. A number of 
intriguing insights emerge from this fledgling literature. Following the American 
understanding, venture capital is here defined to be investments by specialized venture   25 
capital organizations (venture capital funds) in high-growth, high-risk, often high-
technology firms that need capital to finance their start-up, product development, or 
growth and must, by the nature of their business, obtain this capital largely in the form of 
equity rather than debt. Hence, buyout financing that enables managers of mature firms to 
acquire control from current owners is excluded although this is precisely what so called 
venture capitalists often do in Europe.
20  
 
Venture capitalists specifically serve as financial intermediaries in markets where lenders 
and borrowers find it costly to get together, e.g., due to severe moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, or due to high costs of information gathering. Bank credits are in 
these cases not the optimal solution. First, such firms usually lack the necessary collateral 
for debt financing. Second, debt financing excessively restricts the use of incoming cash 
flows already in the early stages of the firms’ lifecycles to fulfilling interest payment 
obligations, thus being undesirable for such firms from a cash management perspective. 
Third, especially in Germany and Japan banks are typically large and provide a range of 
services, so that they lack the specialization and focus to handle small start-ups. In 
contrast, venture capital financing, which usually takes place in stages, is attractive 
especially for start-ups because the equity financing structure gives them great leeway in 
their repayment schedule. In addition, by focusing on start-ups, venture capitalists   
acquire expertise and economies of scale in locating and financing potentially successful 
start-ups.          
 
Albeit venture capital financing is an important way to circumvent liquidity constraints, it 
is crucial to recognize that venture capitalists do not only give money to their portfolio 
companies. Rather, three other aspects are also central to understanding the venture 
capital industry.
21 First, venture capitalists provide management assistance to the 
portfolio company similar to consulting firms. This is possible because the typical 
venture capital fund is a limited partnership run by general partners who are experienced 
at moving companies up the development path. It can therefore help through common 
                                                 
20 See Black and Gilson (1998), Jeng and Wells (1998), and Becker and Hellmann (1999). 
21 See Black and Gilson (1998), and Repullo and Suarez (1999).   26 
problems of high-technology firms when they move from prototype development to 
production, marketing, and distribution. In addition, the venture capital fund’s knowledge 
and experience with prior startup firms in this industry enables it to help its portfolio 
companies in locating experienced personnel. 
 
Second, venture capitalists engage in intensive monitoring of the performance of their 
portfolio firms (Keuschnigg, 1998). They not only have a large incentive to do so due to 
their equity ownership, but also in contrast to universal banks the expertise concerning 
sector-specific knowledge, and the power to act in case things go wrong due to the 
typically substantial levers of control which portfolio companies have to cede to their 
venture capitalists. A particularly important lever of control stems from the typical 
contractual arrangement that capital is only provided in stages by the venture capitalist 
allowing him to withdraw financing at intermediate stages. This serves to prevent the 
entrepreneur/management from diverting some of the firm’s profits to himself rather than 
to the financiers of the firm at large. These control rights are typically disproportionately 
large compared to the size of the financial commitment by venture capitalists. An 
important element in this is the standard procedure that venture capitalists only provide 
funds in stages and that they usually receive convertible debt or convertible preferred 
stock that carries the same voting rights as if it had already been converted into common 
stock. Finally, the venture capitalists often also get a disproportionate representation on 
the board sometimes even up to an absolute majority or veto power over important 
operating decisions by the portfolio company. 
 
Third and often neglected, venture capitalists provide their portfolio companies with 
reputational capital, i.e., similar to other financial intermediaries such as investment 
banks they give credibility to their portfolio companies with third parties whose 
contributions are often crucial to the success of the young firm. Potential and actual 
personnel, suppliers, and customers are all more willing to engage in contractual 
relationships with a firm if a well-known venture capitalist backs it with money and 
advice as well as with control activities. It is in this respect  important to keep in mind 
that the venture capitalist is in possible contrast to a start-up firm a repeat player who   27 
needs to maintain a good reputation in the venture capital market in order to attract future 
engagements. The reputational capital role of the venture capitalist is underlined by the 
fact that venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPO) do empirically not exhibit 
the long-run underperformance that is reported for IPOs in general. This reputational 
effect is of course especially important for early-stage  companies with little reputation of 
their own. Thus, by the time the portfolio company begins to succeed and to build up a 
reputation of its own, the value of the venture capitalist to the portfolio company starts to 
decline and at a certain critical threshold level the money can be more profitably invested 
in other early-stage investments (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000). All three points taken 
together, management assistance, monitoring, and reputational capital, suggest that 
venture capital is actually a variant of relationship-based financing, but as will be shown, 
one which can only flourish in an institutional environment where there exists a well-
functioning arm’s length financial system. Hence, it is in fact a shrewdly-designed hybrid 
system (Tsuru, 2000).         
 
 
2. Institutional Driving Forces of Venture Capital Markets 
 
In order to explain the large cross-country differences in the vitality of venture capital 
markets, it is important to analyze the institutional driving forces of venture capital 
markets. These institutional factors can be distinguished according to whether they affect 
the supply and the demand for venture capital. Jeng and Wells (1998) have in a thorough 
panel data analysis, detected that mainly three  institutional factors make a difference in 
explaining the development of venture capital markets across countries and over time: 
Private pension funds, labor market rigidities, and IPOs.
22  
 
                                                 
22 These empirical results are grosso modo corroborated by Black and Gilson (1998), and Gompers and 
Lerner (1999b). Other potentially important institutional factor are capital gains tax rates and 
codetermination laws. However, it is difficult to make cross-country comparisons of effective marginal tax 
rates and Jeng and Wells (1998) did not dispose over the necessary data for capital gains tax rates for all 
their countries and time periods to include them in their panel-data analysis. Extensive codetermination 
regulations are a predominantly German phenomenon but with potentially important negative repercussions 
on the development  of the venture capital market as they reduce the attractiveness of IPOs.    28 
A first and most conspicuous factor in the growth of the venture capital industry 
especially in the US are private pension funds. Private pension funds are by far the largest 
supplier of venture capital in the US. They supply almost half of all the funds of venture 
capitalists (Black and Gilson, 1998). This is not by coincidence. Rather, raising money 
from pension funds provides a number of advantages to venture capitalists. They can 
thereby quickly raise large amounts of money solely by approaching a few large funds. In 
addition, they can in this way restrict the time they need to spend on keeping their 
financiers informed. Furthermore, due to the peculiar nature of their liabilities pension 
funds can afford to have a relatively long time horizon and they have large funds to 
invest, so that they are well suited for committing part of their money to highly risky 
projects, but with a high expected return on average. Yet, it needs to be recognized that 
the large-scale financing of venture capitalists by pension funds has essentially only been 
possible in the US since the 1979 amendment to the “prudent man” rule governing 
pension fund investment. Prior to 1979, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) barred pension funds from investing substantial amounts of money into venture 
capital or other high-risk asset classes. The Department of Labor’s clarification of the 
rule in 1979 explicitly allowed pension managers to also invest in high-risk assets, 
including venture capital (Kortum and Lerner, 1998). Hence, it should not be surprising 
that the significance of pension funds for explaining the growth of the venture capital 
industry is much greater in the within countries specification of Jeng and Wells (1998), 
which attempts to explain changes over time within countries, than in the between 
specification, which aims at making sense of cross-country differences.  
 
This positive effect of private pension funds on the venture capital industry clearly comes 
from the supply side. However, this is precisely the reason why it is necessary to note a 
caveat against overemphasizing the role of pension funds in explaining cross-country 
differences in the growth of the venture capital industry (Black and Gilson, 1998). It 
seems more appropriate to explain major cross-country differences by demand-side 
factors considering that money is the ultimate fungible commodity.  If there were a 
sufficiently large profitable opportunity set for venture-backed firms and thus demand for 
venture capital, e.g., in countries like Germany and Japan, funds should be available from   29 
other sources and if necessary also other countries. The latter seems hardly necessary in 
countries like Germany and Japan, though, considering that they have a much higher 
savings rate than say the US. Nonetheless, it is striking that the start of the venture capital 
boom in the US coincides with the change in legislation concerning the investment rules 
for pension funds, so that this supply side factor is not to be neglected. 
 
Labor market rigidities are a second important explanatory factor in the panel data 
analysis of Jeng and Wells (1998), which comes from the demand side for venture 
capital, though. In particular strict employment protection legislation such as is prevalent 
in most continental European countries hampers the growth of the venture capital 
industry because it makes hiring workers more risky, thus depriving venture-backed firms 
of the flexibility to lay off workers quickly and at little cost at a later stage. Furthermore, 
rigid labor markets typically lead to higher labor costs which makes it less attractive to 
start a new business in the first place. Finally and probably most importantly, leaving a 
possibly permanent job with sizable seniority rights in a large corporation in order to start 
one’s own business is a much riskier and possibly irreversible decision in a highly 
regulated labor market with much smaller relative flows in particular out of 
unemployment. If the new venture is not as successful as expected or even fails, it might 
be very difficult for the would-be entrepreneur to reacquire a position as an employee 
with similar pay, status, and job security as before. Hence, a highly regulated labor 
market can indeed be expected to deter would-be entrepreneurs from risking to try to start 
their own business (Becker and Hellmann, 1999).  
 
It is kind of obvious that all these labor market effects matter more for early-stage 
venture-backed investments than for later stage ones due to the higher risk of bankruptcy 
in the former case. This is also reflected in the empirical results. Labor market rigidities 
only exert a statistically significant negative effect on the growth of the venture capital 
industry in the cross-country specification if the dependent variable is restricted to early-
stage investments. However, a caveat is again in order. Employment protection 
legislation such as severance payments typically builds over time and are thus less 
burdensome for start-up firms. Moreover, unpaid severance obligations are of little   30 
significance in case of bankruptcy. They only expand the pool of unsecured claims on the 
remaining assets of the firms. Hence, it is probably the last above-mentioned effect which 
counts most: Highly regulated labor markets with large seniority components concerning 
salaries and job security especially in large firms act as a deterrent against becoming an 
entrepreneur thus reducing the demand  for early-stage venture capital.   
 
The third empirically important institutional factor in the panel analysis of Jeng and 
Wells (1998) are IPOs. IPOs turn out to be the main driving force for the venture capital 
industry across countries. IPOs are the only institutional factor, which is statistically 
significant in both specifications, across countries and over time. IPOs can be expected to 
positively influence both, the supply and the demand for venture capital. The positive 
effect of IPOs is stronger for later-stage than for early-stage venture-backed investments. 
Once again, the main risk faced by investors in general and venture capitalists in 
particular is not getting their money back. Thus, a viable exit mechanism is key to the 
development of a thriving venture capital industry from the point of view of the supply 
side and it should come as little surprise that countries which lack such a viable exit route 
lag behind in terms of the size of their venture capital industry.  
 
However, an exit mechanism is also essential to the entrepreneur, i.e., to the demand for 
venture capital for two reasons (Black and Gilson, 1998). First, it provides a financial 
incentive for equity-compensated managers to increase effort because they know with 
greater certainty in such a case that higher efforts on their part will eventually be 
financially rewarded. Second, it gives the managers a call option on control of the firm 
because venture capitalists relinquish control at the time of the IPO. It is important to 
understand that this is a crucial factor in the implicit agreement between the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs want to retain control over their firm. 
However, they cannot demand that they be allowed to maintain control at the time when 
they seek venture financing because they often have not even run a start-up company 
before. Venture capitalists therefore rationally insist on being ceded ultimate control 
rights to protect themselves against the risk that the entrepreneur blunders in running the   31 
venture or extracts private benefits from the firm instead of maximizing its value to all 
investors. 
 
The situation is beginning to change, though, once the start-up firm has succeeded and 
the entrepreneur has proven his management skills and has provided some evidence that 
he can be trusted in dealing with other people’s money. The positive management and 
reputation effects that the venture capitalist provides for the firm start to diminish at this 
point so that it becomes more and more likely that the value of the firm is actually 
maximized by returning control. Yet, regaining control is mainly possible for the 
entrepreneur via an IPO, whereas the alternative route of selling the whole company 
normally entails the complete loss of control for the entrepreneur.  
 
An IPO is in any case only available to the portfolio company when it is indeed 
successful because only then will a highly reputable investment bank underwrite the IPO, 
thus putting its own capital and reputation into the offering. A central role of an 
investment bank in an IPO is to act as an information intermediary who puts his 
reputation at stake on behalf of the portfolio company, thus signalling to the stock market 
at large that buying shares of this company is likely to be a profitable investment. Hence, 
the investment bank plays a partially similar role to the venture capitalist, only at a later 
stage of the lifecycle of the firm.  
 
It might be objected, though, that the venture capitalist cannot credibly commit ex ante to 
returning control and to accepting the IPO contingent on a concept as nebulous as 
success. However, this objection turns out to be wrong. The venture capitalist does not 
have an incentive to breach the implicit agreement and prevent the entrepreneur from 
exercising his call option on an IPO in case he is successful and has found a prestigious 
investment bank as underwriter of the IPO. To see this, it is important to recall once again 
that the venture capitalist is a repeat player who does not want to acquire a reputation as 
preventing successful portfolio firms from going public. Rather, the opposite is true, 
having a track record of many successful IPOs will help the venture capitalist to stay in  
business, expand, and to obtain highly promising portfolio firms in the future. Hence, this   32 
credibility argument in an infinite horizon game is crucial for the viability of the standard 
implicit contract between entrepreneurs in portfolio firms and venture capitalists.  
 
It is in this respect important to keep in mind that venture capitalists typically specialize 
in dealing with geographically close portfolio companies, which is reflected in the heavy 
geographical concentration of the venture capital industry in the US in the northeast and 
in northern California (table 3). This not only facilitates monitoring on the part of the 
venture capitalist, but it also fosters the emergence of a reputation market, where a valid 
claim that a venture capitalist does not live up to this implicit contractual agreement 
would quickly thwart his future chances of becoming lead investor in the most attractive 
start-up companies.
23 In sum, the availability of an IPO appears to be central for a 
thriving venture capital market and the actual number of IPOs is likely to understate this 
crucial link because it is also the mere possibility of an IPO which prods venture-backed 
start-ups. However, IPOs require an active stock market with large-scale trading, so that 
bank-centered financial markets with great banking activity but relatively small stock 
markets such as in Germany or Japan are not conducive to the growth of the venture 
capital market.         
 
Table 3: Venture Capital Fundraising in the US by Region in 1999 ($ Bil.) 
 
Northeast Northern 
California 
Mid-
Atlantic 
Southern 
California 
Midwest South-/   
Northwest 
Rocky 
Mountain 
Southeast 
16.62 16.22 4.95 3.03  2.60  1.49  1.13  0.82 
 
Source: National Venture Capital Association 
 
 
IV. Why Is Venture Capital at Odds with Corporatism? 
 
Despite its beneficial on employment growth, the venture capital market is still far less 
developed in continental European countries than in Anglo-Saxon countries. This  might 
be related to different principles guiding economic policy making. While Anglo-Saxon 
                                                 
23 See Black and Gilson (1998), Becker and Hellmann (1999), and Gompers and Lerner (1999b).   33 
countries are by and large dominated by a view that puts great faith in the functioning of 
unfettered markets, the so-called corporatist approach to economic policy is much more 
prevalent in continental Europe. Corporatism is in some way an attempt to find a middle 
ground between market capitalism and socialism by means of a consensus-oriented 
policy. Corporatism aims at achieving macroeconomic progress in terms of high GDP 
and employment growth and of low inflation on the basis of explicit, often tripartite 
agreements involving unions, employers federations, and the government.
24 These 
agreements tend to take place on a centralized level. Relatively centralized wage 
agreements or pattern bargaining are almost a defining feature of corporatist countries. 
Corporatists typically distrust the beneficial effects of strong competition on labor and 
capital markets in terms of achieving these macroeconomic goals. In particular, wage 
competition on the labor market is regarded to be harmful in terms of efficiency and 
politically unacceptable for its impact on income distribution.
25  
 
The previous section showed that a fully fledged market for IPOs is a key prerequisite for 
a thriving venture capital market. Undertaking an IPO is more attractive for the 
entrepreneur in an institutional environment which is highly protective of shareholders, 
so that potential bidders for shares are willing to pay a higher price per share, and where 
the private benefits of controlling a company are relatively small.
26 Both of these 
conditions are fulfilled to a larger extent in Anglo-Saxon countries than in corporatist 
continental European countries. As we have already seen, shareholders are better 
protected by law and its effective enforcement in Anglo-Saxon countries than in 
continental Europe. Furthermore, stakeholder interests matter more in continental Europe 
than in Anglo-Saxon countries. A prominent example is the German codetermination law 
which gives German workers in public firms a direct say in routine policy decisions in 
firms, thus interfering directly with the common prerogative of shareholders and 
managers as their agents and making it less attractive for firms to go public.
27  
                                                 
24 The corporatist idea is currently experiencing some kind of renaissance in continental Europe in general 
and in Germany in particular as the corporatist Dutch model is seen to be more palatable than the US 
model.   
25 See Berthold and Hank (1999), and Roe (1999). 
26 See Bebchuk (1999), and Coffee (1999). 
27 See Roe (1999), and Coffee (1999).   34 
 
The private benefits of controlling a company are also considerably larger in corporatist 
continental European countries. First, the private benefits of control are negatively related 
to the level of shareholder protection, because greater shareholder protection makes it 
more difficult for an entrepreneur to divert funds from the company to himself. Second, 
high levels of private benefits of control lead to less publicly traded companies and to a 
higher concentration of ownership in those firms which are publicly traded. This is 
precisely what can be observed when comparing continental European countries to 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Hence, it is more than difficult to replicate the success in a 
number of Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of creating a venture capital market in a bank-
centered financial market where creditors are much better protected than shareholders. In 
line with this argument, the average age of a firm undertaking an IPO in continental 
Europe is empirically much higher than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Coffee, 1999). 
 
The key question which arises is to identify the underlying politicoeconomic causes for 
these persistent differences in financial market structures in general and in shareholder 
protection in particular. It is striking that Anglo-Saxon countries not only feature more 
pronounced shareholder protection and more vibrant stock and venture capital markets, 
but that they also tend to have less regulated labor markets, where market forces are 
given greater leeway. Labeling managers/entrepreneurs and employed workers as insiders 
on financial and labor markets respectively, insider protection on both, financial and 
labor markets, is much less prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries compared to its 
omnipresence in continental European countries. Albeit this cross-market, cross-country 
relationship has received little attention in the literature so far, it appears to be potentially 
important in explaining persistent differences in institutions in these markets and in 
unemployment performances across countries. This is in particular the case because a 
higher level of shareholder protection is conducive to IPOs, which are again a 
prerequisite for a vibrant venture capital market, which has in turn in recent years become 
an important factor driving employment growth. 
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The three main groups interested in the level of shareholder protection on financial 
markets and in the level of employment protection on labor markets are workers,   
entrepreneurs, and investors.
28 It is assumed that workers prefer higher employment 
protection and ceteris paribus also higher shareholder protection. The latter preference 
might appear strange on first glance but appears nonetheless justified. First, the more 
stocks workers own themselves, the more they benefit ceteris paribus from a higher level 
of shareholder protection in the whole constituency. Second, in a longer-run perspective 
higher shareholder protection facilitates the acquisition of new risk bearing capital thus 
enhancing in general the earnings potential and job security of incumbent workers. It is 
furthermore assumed that entrepreneurs dislike both shareholder and employment 
protection, and that shareholders like shareholder protection and dislike employment 
protection. Hence, investors and entrepreneurs have the same preferences concerning 
employment protection legislation, but they have opposing preferences on investor 
protection because low investor protection allows entrepreneurs to partially appropriate 
investors ex post. In contrast, workers prefer higher employment protection and possibly 
also higher shareholder protection. Hence, they have the same preferences on shareholder 
protection as investors in general but stand alone on the issue of firing costs.  
 
It is for simplicity assumed that for any legislation to pass, it needs to be approved by at 
least two out of these three interest groups. This could in principle be the result of both, 
direct democracy or representative democracy. In the latter case, interest groups push 
delegates to vote according to their preferences.
29 The result of the democratic decision 
process depends crucially on the voting and bargaining procedure. Two types of 
politicoeconomic equilibria arise from this setup. If neither bargaining between interest 
groups nor binding precommitments concerning their voting behavior nor joint voting on 
both issues at the same time are possible, the solution is obtained immediately. Both 
issues will then be put on the table sequentially and such an atomistic society with little 
                                                 
28 See Pagano and Volpin (1999), and Fehn and Meier (2000). 
29 Under direct democracy there could be a problem if workers on their own represent an absolute majority 
and do therefore not need the support of any one of the other two interest groups. The  representative 
democracy case with interest groups pushing political parties to vote  in their interest therefore fits better. 
This is in particular the case because, albeit workers are usually more numerous, their per capita financial 
wealth is smaller compared to the other two interest groups, so that their per capita ability to sway parties 
according to their preferences by donating money is also lower.      36 
coherence will always choose this type of institutional setup which is favored by two out 
of these three interest  groups. There will be maximum investor protection because this is 
the solution preferred by investors and workers, while employment protection will be 
minimal because investors and entrepreneurs want firing costs to be as small as possible. 
This outcome and the underlying assumption about the type of society tend to reflect the 
more fragmented Anglo-Saxon countries and in particular the US. 
 
An alternative scenario is a voting procedure where bargaining between parties and 
credible precommitments are possible and where there is therefore de facto a joint vote 
on both issues at the same time. The outcome of such a bargaining environment depends 
on which interest groups are most influential and are likely to align. There exist at least 
three arguments why the coalition between entrepreneurs and workers is especially likely 
to form. First, compared to entrepreneurs and workers, investors are a highly 
heterogeneous group of people with very diverse interests and with a large free rider 
problem. Similar to consumers, it is much more difficult for investors to organize and to 
sustain a powerful lobby than it is for entrepreneurs and workers since each investor 
usually has rather little at stake. Second and related, a significant part of investors usually 
consists of foreigners in highly developed countries and under the rapidly progressing 
globalization of capital markets. It is immediately evident, that the interests of such non-
residents matter less in the political decision-making process. They hardly contribute to 
forming a powerful political lobby protecting investors’ rights (Coffee, 1999). The third 
argument why investors are probably shunned as coalition partners is rooted in the well-
known time-inconsistency or credibility problem.
30 The likely consequence of an ex-post 
dropout of one of the coalition partners is a return to the previous scenario with simple 
sequential decisions on both issues without any coalitions or political bargains involved. 
But it has already been shown that under such an atomistic setup high shareholder 
protection is going to be chosen which investors like of course. Hence, in an environment 
with bargaining at the outset investors can always gain by pretending to enter into a 
coalition and to agree on a compromise with either entrepreneurs or workers, only to later 
on renege on this agreement so that they will in fact attain their preferred solution. 
                                                 
30 See Barro and Gordon (1983), and Kydland and Prescott (1977).   37 
However, rational entrepreneurs and workers anticipate that assurances of investors 
cannot be trusted and they therefore do not enter into a coalition with them in the first 
place.  
 
In sum, in a bargaining environment with coalitions of interest groups being crucial for 
the institutional outcome, a situation that can be denoted as a corporatist setting, it can be 
expected that investors are kept out of coalitions and that entrepreneurs and workers are 
the decisive interest groups. Such an assessment also seems warranted by casual 
observation of what appears to be characteristic of corporatist continental European 
countries. It is quite evident that the outcome of such a bargain will involve little 
shareholder protection and substantial employment protection. Recalling that 
entrepreneurs dislike shareholder and employment protection, while workers have a 
strong desire for high employment protection but at most a weak preference for higher 
shareholder protection, a bargained compromise between workers and entrepreneurs will 
inevitably be distinct from the solution in fragmented societies. It will involve higher 
employment protection and less shareholder protection than in the atomistic society, 
where the institutional setup is decided upon in a sequential voting procedure.  Hence, 
there are two distinct politicoeconomic equilibria. Fragmented Anglo-Saxon societies 
choose the preferred solution of investors with high shareholder and low employment 
protection, while corporatist continental European societies can be expected to end up in 
a compromise between entrepreneurs and workers, therefore setting employment 
protection higher and shareholder protection lower. As was already shown, however, 
both, higher firing costs and lower shareholder protection, hinder the development of the 
venture capital market, so that  the outcome of the corporatist politicoeconomic 
equilibrium is in direct contradiction with a vibrant venture capital market.  
 
Yet, it is important to recognize that corporatism on the labor and the capital market 
typically involves more instruments than just high employment and low shareholder 
protection. Firing costs are only one way of protecting insiders on the labor market 
against market forces such as adverse aggregate shocks or structural change. Further 
instruments which aim at essentially the same goal are unemployment insurance, welfare   38 
benefits, active labor market policies, centralized wage bargaining, and minimum wages. 
Unemployment insurance guarantees insiders a certain level of income protection for a 
limited period of time if insiders are laid off despite of high firing costs. In fact, Buti et 
al. (1998) argue that firing costs and unemployment insurance can be regarded as 
substitutes in their very purpose of protecting insiders, but with unemployment insurance 
possibly inferfering less with structural change. Welfare benefits of course step in once 
unemployment insurance runs out. Active labor market policies protect insiders against 
structural change in helping them to adjust their skills to the changing needs of the 
market. Actual active labor market policies are hardly ever designed to directly raise the 
competitiveness of outsiders vis-à-vis current insiders.
31 Centralized wage bargaining and 
minimum wages are both instruments to reduce wage differentiation at the lower end of 
the wage distribution thus protecting insiders against rapid and great wage reductions in 
case the forces of structural change work to their disadvantage. All five policy 
instruments are in addition to firing costs typical ingredients of corporatist arrangements 
on the labor market.  
 
Similarly, low shareholder protection is just one way of favoring insiders on financial 
markets. Opaque accounting rules which give entrepreneurs/managers large leeway to 
manipulate stated profits are another way of shielding insiders on financial markets from 
interference by outsiders. Furthermore, entrepreneurs and managers want to be protected 
against competition by new firms and against takeovers by other firms which might lead 
to their dismissal, leading to entry barriers against new firms and anti-takeover 
legislation. The key prediction of this politicoeconomic approach, namely that there 
should be a positive correlation between these two sets of insider-protecting instruments 
on labor and financial markets across countries is in fact confirmed by cross-country data 
for the OECD countries (Fehn and Meier (2000).  
 
In a nutshell, the case can be made that preferential treatment of insiders on labor and 
financial markets in continental Eurpean countries are part of an encompassing 
corporatist deal to shut out competition on both markets. This comes at the expense of 
                                                 
31 See Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), and Saint-Paul (1998).   39 
shareholders, of future potential entrepreneurs, and of the unemployed. This might partly 
explain why the strenuous attempts of continental European countries in general and of 
the EU in particular to emulate the US in terms of creating a vibrant venture capital have 
up to now been met at best with meager success. The basic reason suggested here is quite 
simple. Achieving a vibrant venture capital market necessitates disrupting the corporatist 
politicoeconomic equilibrium which typically involves high employment and low 
shareholder protection as key ingredients. A well-functioning venture capital market 
enhances competition on the product market and thereby indirectly also on the labor and 
financial market. Venture capital promotes the entry of new firms and is conducive to 
structural change, thus reducing quasi-rents and undermining the position of current 
insiders on labor and financial markets who are the dominant players in corporatist 
countries. However, the existence of sizable quasi-rents, which can be shared by both 
types of insiders, is an important prerequisite for the viability of corporatism (Tsuru, 
2000). Venture capital is therefore at odds with corporatism, a notion that is still widely 
embraced in continental Europe.
32 
   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The primary lesson arising from the analysis is actually by no means novel, but has rather 
already been emphasized by Walter Eucken. Institutional structures on markets such as 
the labor market or the financial market should not be analyzed in  isolation because they 
are highly interdependent. The corporatist, non-competitive institutional setup on 
continental European labor markets seems to be intricately linked to the prevailing 
                                                 
32 A further reason for the persistent cross-country differences in the institutional setups on financial 
markets appears to be path dependence. Efficiency, legal heritage, as well as rent-seeking considerations 
can lead to such path dependence of financial market structures. From a political economy perspective, the 
rent-seeking argument seems to be at the core also of path dependence. The efficiency argument does not 
carry great weight considering that continental European financial market structure with little shareholder 
protection and therefore also underdeveloped venture capital markets is a non-negligible factor in 
explaining persistently high unemployment in continental Europe. Furthermore, the legal tradition 
argument is also not fully convincing either, considering that laws can and have been changed even against 
traditions in other areas when this was regarded as politically beneficial by the legislature; see Roe (1999), 
and Bebchuk and Roe (1999).  
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structures on financial  markets by politicoeconomic forces. Hence, it should from that  
perspective not be surprising that venture capital markets in continental Europe still lag 
behind their Anglo-Saxon counterparts despite of substantial government efforts on the 
national and EU level to catch up. A vibrant venture capital market, which makes future 
outcomes less predictable and undermines the position of insider on labor and financial 
markets, is simply at odds with the corporatist, consensus-oriented model which 
governments in continental Europe still cling to. 
 
Unfunded pay-as-you-go pensions systems, highly regulated labor markets, and little 
shareholder protection are the primary institutional obstacles for venture capital markets 
to thrive. Continental Europe simply cannot have it both ways, maintaining on the one 
hand its cozy institutional framework on labor and financial markets which is mainly 
built on long-term relationships between insiders on both markets as well as between 
these insiders and governments, and importing on the other hand the innovative, 
competitive, and somewhat anarchic element which inevitably comes about with fully-
fledged venture capital markets. Cross-country empirical evidence shows that it will in 
the long run have to be either one or the other. The longer mass unemployment in 
continental Europe persists the more likely it is that the heydays of corporatism at least in 
the above-defined form are over, due to the rising pressure to deregulate labor markets, to 
expand shareholder protection, and to develop fully fledged venture capital markets. This 
will require accepting greater income inequalities between people and larger income 
variability over time, both of which corporatism was traditionally aimed at suppressing.        
 
If governments in continental Europe nonetheless want to play an active role in this 
development toward making more room for market forces via fostering venture capital 
markets, the analysis has pointed out three important levers. First, reforming current pay-
as-you-go pension systems toward greater funding and allowing the arising pension funds 
to invest part of their assets in venture capital can be expected to spur venture capital 
markets in continental Europe. Second, rigid labor markets hinder the development of 
venture capital markets and are therefore also via this indirect channel harmful for 
employment growth. However, both funding the pension system as well as deregulating   41 
the labor market and especially lowering firing costs are politically risky undertakings. 
Therefore, the third lever might be politically more appealing. Expanding shareholder 
protection and facilitating IPOs should be less controversial politically and might 
nonetheless also trigger a process which produces in the long run institutional 
frameworks on labor and financial markets which are characterized by more openness 
and less insider preference. It should in particular be possible to install two-tier systems, 
meaning that the rules of the game concerning especially shareholder protection are 
different for start-up firms compared to the old established firms. The “Neuer Markt” in 
Germany can in fact be viewed as such an attempt, which has been reasonably successful 
so far.   
 
In sum, the ongoing changes in institutional structures on financial markets in continental 
Europe, which are among other things triggerred off by the rapid globalization of 
financial markets, raise the pressure to abandon corporatist structures also on labor 
markets. Although painful in the short run, this development can be expected to raise 
employment growth in the longer run, assuming that the current era of rapid structural 
change and high volatilities is not temporary but rather persists. Hence, while 
globalization is often used as a political scapegoat, it might in fact be a blessing in 
disguise for continental Europe as it helps to overcome its institutional sclerosis on labor 
and financial markets, and thereby indirectly also on product markets. 
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